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I.  The  Agricultural  Problem
Three characteristics  dominate  the agricultural  scene in the  1960's
as  was  the  case  in  the  1950's.  They  are:  widespread  technological
advance,  a  competitive  market organization,  and an  inelastic  demand
for  food,  and  these  interrelated  factors  give  rise  to  chronically  low
prices  and incomes  in peacetime.
A.  Widespread  technological  advance.  This  is a  part of the American
creed;  Americans  value  it  highly  in  all  sectors  of  the  economy.
It  is generously  financed  in  agriculture;  hence,  we  can  expect  a
continuous  outpouring  of new  technologies.  In this  dynamic  situa-
tion  farmers  do  not  seek  the  minimum  point  on  some  long-run
static  planning curve; year after year they move from one long-run
planning  curve  to  the next,  but  always  to a lower  curve.  The only
real question is:  At what rate  is this technological  advance  going to
occur;  hence,  at  what  rate  is  the  aggregate  supply  function  going
to shift  to the  right?  Technological  advance  is the  key  variable  in
agricultural  production.
B.  A competitive  market organization.  This  is  the engine  of the farm
economic  system;  a  competitive  market  organization  provides  the
incentive  for  widespread  technological  advance  and  the  motive
power for a  continuously expanding  aggregate output. Each farmer
reasons  that  he  cannot  influence  prices,  but  he  can  get  his  costs
down by adopting  new techniques,  new practices. When all farmers
do this,  aggregate  output expands,  and since  1940  it has expanded
persistently.
C.  The  inelastic  demand  for  food.  Expanding  supplies  would  create
no  problem  if  the  price  and  income  elasticities  for  food  were
greater  than  1.0.  But  they  are  not;  they  are  exceedingly  low-ap-
proaching  0.2  in  the  aggregate.  Expanding  supplies,  growing  out
of  widespread  technological  advance,  press  against  the  inelastic
demand for food and drive farm  prices to low  levels and hold them
there.
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A.  Labor mobility.  The farm problem  under the CED'  approach  is to
be solved  by moving workers out  of agriculture.  Farm people have
been  moving  out  of  agriculture  at  a  rapid  rate  since  1940.  The
farm labor force has declined at an average annual rate of  150,000
since  1951.  The  CED recommends  that this rate  be stepped  up to
400,000  to  500,000  per  year  in  the  next  five  years.  Two  serious
objections to this CED approach are:
1.  The  economy  is already  faced  with  higher  rates  of  unemploy-
ment than are  generally tolerable; hence,  it should not be asked
to  absorb an  accelerated  rate of movement off farms.  The pros-
pects  for such  a  movement  are  very  remote.
2.  The  CED  made  the  assumption  that  most  of  the  proposed
outmigration  would  come  from  commercial  agriculture,  and
hence,  that  it would  have an  important  effect  on farm  output.
It  seems  more  realistic  to  expect  the  low-income  farm  popula-
tion  to  make  up  the  bulk  of  movement  from  agriculture,
whether  at  accelerated  or recent  rates.  This  makes  a  great deal
of  difference,  for the  average  farm worker  on  the  highly  com-
mercial  farm produces  more  than  twice  as much  as  the  worker
in the  $2,500  to  $5,000  sales  group,  and  more  than five  times
as  much  as  the average  worker on farms with sales  of less than
$2,500  per  year.  If  the  large  reduction  in  farm  workers  pro-
jected  by  CED  came  heavily  from  low-income  areas,  it  could
not  possibly  be expected  to  cut farm  output.  Even  if migration
from  commercial  agriculture  were  to  be  rapid,  farm  output
should not be expected  to decline significantly,  since  farm  tech-
nology will  readily bridge the gap.
B.  Vertical  integration.  This  will  not  stop  the flood  tide of food  sup-
plies any more than laying pipes vertically  in a flooding river would
serve  to  dam  that  river.  More  vertical  integration  will  shift  the
bargaining  power  of buyers  and sellers  in  agricultural  commodity
markets around  a bit  (probably away  from farmer-producers),  but
it  has no  capacity  to  deal with  the  basic  problem  of  general  over-
production.
C.  The  many  other  popular  solutions  that  might  be mentioned  (e.g.,
flexible  price supports,  production  payments,  fixed price supports)
all  run  squarely  into  the  hard  facts  of  too  much  production  this
year and too much in the foreseeable future.
1An  Adaptive  Program for  Agriculture, Committee  for  Economic  Development,
New York,  1962.
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If farmers  want good  and stable incomes,  and if the rest of society
will not  underwrite  the  continuing  costs  of price  and income  support,
then  farmers  must  accept  some  form  of  supply  management-there  is
no  other  alternative.  They  must  accept  supply  management  devices
that  enable  the  many  producers  in  agriculture  to adjust supplies to
demand, in the  great problem commodities.
A.  Since  1951  the  urban  sector  of  society  has  underwritten  the  cost
of  price  and  income  support  in  agriculture-transferring  directly
some  2  to  5  billion  dollars  of  income  into  agriculture  each  year
in  the  past  decade  through  price  and  income  programs  and  com-
modity  disposal  operations.  But  will  society  continue  to  do  this?
It seems  highly doubtful.  When the  urban  sector no longer is will-
ing  to  pick  up  the  check,  then  farm  people  must decide  whether
they  want good  and  stable  incomes  or  complete  freedom  to  plant
and  reap  as  they please.  They  cannot  have  the  best  of  these  two
possible  worlds  unless  the  rest  of  society  is  willing  to  pick  up the
check.
B.  I  am  well  aware  that  farmers  generally  consider  controls  over
supply  to  be  a  nuisance,  and I  am  not sure  that they  will come  to
adopt effective  supply management  programs  in the next few years.
Certainly  they will not if farmers  value freedom of decision  making
as  highly  as  some  farm  leaders  think  they  do.  But  if  they  value
good  and  stable  incomes  more  than  they  do  complete  freedom
in  farm  decision  making  (as  I  think  they  do),  and  they  come  to
realize  what  a  free  market  really  means  to  them  (in  the  middle
1960's  a  return  to  the  free  market,  and  assuming  away  govern-
ment-owned  stocks,  the farm price level might be 25 to  40 percent
lower than it is and net incomes  more than 50 percent lower),  then
they  may  be very  happy to  adopt  effective  supply management.  It
is  not unrealistic  to conclude  that when farmers  become convinced
that good  and stable  incomes  are  absolutely  dependent  upon effec-
tive  supply  control,  they  will approve  of and accept  these controls
-witness  the  actions of tobacco  growers  and sugar producers.
C.  To repeat  then-if farmers  really  want  and are  determined  to have
good  and  stable  prices  and  incomes  as  a  regular  thing,  they  must
come to  accept effective  production and marketing  controls.
1.  They must curb  the force  of too much production  arising  from
widespread  technological  advance.
2.  They  can  do  this  only  by  disciplining  themselves  through  the
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ment.
D.  Basic  to  the  supply  management  approach  is  the  concept  of  an
industry  composed  of many,  many small  producing  units acting  in
concert with  the aid  and consent of Congress to produce  the  quan-
tities  of food  and  fiber required by  consumers,  at  a  fair return  to
the  producers  involved.  In  this  view,  government  establishes  the
institutional  machinery  and grants  the  limited power to  agriculture
to  enable  the  many,  many  producers  involved  to  produce  those
quantities  of farm  products demanded  by consumers  at a fair price.
For this  grant  of limited  power,  government  reserves  for  itself the
right  to determine price-support  levels,  hence the right to determine
fair  returns  to  the  producers  involved  and  protect  the  consumer
interest.
E.  The  basic  principles  of  this  supply management  approach  to  agri-
culture  are as  follows:
1.  Congress  would  set  fair,  or  parity,  prices  for agriculture,  as  it
does  now.  But  in  this  scheme  of things  the role  of parity  prices
has  changed.  Parity  prices  would  serve  as  guides  for  setting
national marketing quotas rather than for setting price  supports.
Thus,  in determining  parity  prices for agriculture,  the Congress
would in fact be determining  fair prices for both consumers  and
producers,  and  the  needs  and  interests  of  both  groups  would
have to be considered.
2.  The  U.  S.  Department  of  Agriculture  would  set  national  mar-
keting  quotas  for  those  principal  agricultural  commodities  for
which  programs  were  adopted,  in  such  amounts  as  the  USDA
estimates  will  clear  the  market  at  the  predetermined  fair,  or
parity,  prices.  Depending  upon  the  commodity,  this  might  or
might  not  mean  spelling  the  national  quota  out  into  acreage
allotments  by  states,  counties,  and  farms.  These  national  mar-
keting  quotas  would,  of  course,  vary  from  year  to  year as  de-
mand  conditions  changed,  or  as  Congress  redefined  parity
prices.
3.  Each  farmer  at  the  inception  of  the  program  would  receive  a
market  share,  his  pro  rata  share,  of  the  national  sales  quota
for each commodity,  based probably  on his historical  record  of
production.  Depending  upon the  commodity,  this market  share
might  be  stated  in  commodity  units  or  acreage.  Each  farmer
would  be permitted  to market  his  market share free  of penalty,
but  on  amounts  in  excess  of his  market  share  he would  pay  a
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program.
4.  Marketing  rights  would  be  negotiable.  Each  farmer  would  be
free to transfer his market share either by sale, rental, or admin-
istrative  rule.  By this device  freedom  of entry and exit would be
maintained  within  a  managed  agriculture;  the  individual  farm
operator  would  be  free  to  expand  or  contract  production,  in
light of local conditions,  as  total output was adjusted  to demand
at  a  defined  fair  price.  This  final  principle  represents  a  long-
range  goal  of  supply  management  which  is  not  yet  fully  ac-
cepted  but  which  must  come  if  supply  management  is  to  be
effective  and successful.
F.  Many  side  programs  could,  and possibly  should,  be  linked  to  the
above skeletonized  proposal.  To illustrate,  the United  States  might
for a  variety  of reasons  (e.g.,  human  welfare,  international  collec-
tive  security)  wish  to  subsidize  food  exports  to  needy  nations  to
help  finance  their  long-term  programs  of  economic  development.
Thus,  the  national  sales  quota  for  any  one  year  would  equal
domestic  demand  plus  any  commercial  exports  plus  subsidized
exports.  And  if  the  decision  were  made  to  establish  and  maintain
a  strategic  food reserve,  the  requirements  of such  a  reserve  would
need  to  be  taken  into  account  each  year  in  the  determination  of
national sales quotas.
In  another  direction,  it  might  prove  beneficial  to  both  pro-
ducers  and consumers  for the  U. S. Department  of Agriculture  to
operate  a  purchase,  storage,  and  disposal  program  in  connection
with the  general control program,  where in years  of below-average
yields  government  held  stocks  were  put  on  the  market  to  hold
prices  at  the  defined  parity  prices,  and  in  years  of  above-average
yields marketing  quotas  were  increased by  a few percentage  points
and  the  excess  supply  was  purchased  and  placed  in storage.  This
type  of  bona  fide  storage  program  would  serve  to  stabilize  mar-
ketable  supplies,  and  ease  the  production  problems  of  farmers
arising out of weather uncertainty.
IV.  Practical  Application  of  Supply  Management  Principles
Three  major  commodity  proposals  have  been  made  to  Congress
by  the  administration  in  the  past  year-for  feed  grains,  wheat,  and
milk.
The  feed grains  and wheat programs would start with a  determina-
tion  of  the  requirements  of the  market  at price-support  levels  geared
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total requirement,  or aggregate demand,  would be expressed nationally
as  a marketing  or  sales  quota,  and as  a  national  acreage  requirement.
Beyond  the national  level,  however,  each  state, each  county,  and each
farm would  find its  share of the market expressed  in terms of the num-
ber  of  acres  which-with  average  expected  yields-would  produce  the
respective share of the national marketing quota.
Price  support,  in the case  of feed grains,  would  be provided  on all
production  on  the  acreage  allotment.  For  wheat,  price  support would
be  provided  at  a  level  between  75  and  90  percent  of  parity  for  an
amount  of  wheat used domestically  and a  share  of the export  market,
and  at  a  level  related  to  the  feed  grain  and  world  wheat  prices  for
the balance.
A feature  of both programs-essential  to the shrinking  of aggregate
supply-would  be  diversion  of  the  acreage  removed  from  grains  to
conservation  uses or  other more  extensive  purposes.  Payments  would
be  provided for  a limited  time to support incomes  but with the manda-
tory  program,  would not be essential to effective operation.
In  both  cases,  failure  of producers  to  approve  the  program  by  a
two-thirds  majority,  would  result  in  unlimited  production  with  either
no price support  or very  limited price support.
V.  Criticisms  of  Supply  Control  Approach
Numerous  criticisms  have and can be leveled  at this supply control
approach.  The most  common  are:  (1)  the  capitalization  of monopoly
gains  into  land  values  argument  and  (2)  the  loss  of  efficiency
argument.
A.  It  is commonly  argued  that  the monopoly  gains  resulting  from  the
successful  control of supplies would be capitalized  into land values.
Hence,  the  question  is  asked-of  what  possible  benefit  could  such
controls  be  to  farmers?  Increased  net  farm  incomes,  whether  they
arise out of wartime  demand,  supply control,  or a natural  shortage
of land,  always get capitalized  into land  values.  Thus,  the question
might  be  asked-are  we  never  to  help  increase  farm  incomes  be-
cause  such  income  increases  get capitalized  into land?  Benefits  to
farmers  resulting  from  effective  supply  management  (i.e.,  rising
net  incomes  first,  and  more  stable  incomes  second)  would  get
capitalized  into  land  values,  and  in  the  longer  run  average  costs
per  unit  of  output would  come  to equal  average  revenue.  But  this
is not  bad;  it  is simply  a  restatement  of  the  old  adage  that "You
don't  get  something  for nothing  in  this  world."  In  this  longer run
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ways:
1.  Production  planning  would  be  facilitated  as  year-to-year  com-
modity price variations  were leveled  out.
2.  Farmers  would be free  of that gnawing fear that they might lose
their  farm,  and  see their  other  assets  melt  away,  under  one  of
those wide  and  periodic  down  swings  in  the  farm price  level.
Thus,  with  effective  supply  control,  farmers  would  be  operating
in a stabilized market-the kind of market that much of industry enjoys.
B.  There  is  no reason  to  believe  that society  would  suffer  any  impor-
tant loss in efficiency  under  the supply management  route outlined
here.  Farmers  would  continue  to  take  prices  as  given,  and  each
farmer  would  seek  to  produce  his  quota  share  as  cheaply  as  pos-
sible  to  maximize  his  individual  profits.  The  incentive  to  adopt
new cost reducing  technologies is still  a part of the system. If at the
parity  prices  established  by Congress,  farmers  generally  began  to
make  excessive  profits-higher  returns  on  their  investments  than
in  other  parts  of  the  economy-this  would  be used  as  evidence  in
political  debate  to lower the level of parity prices to farmers.  Parity
prices  in  this  context  would  be  set and  reset  in the  same  general
way  as  they  are  now,  namely,  through  public  pressure,  political
debate,  and  group  action.  Assuming  a  constant  price  level,  we
could expect the benefits arising out of farm technological  advances
to  be passed  along  to  consumers  as  the  level of parity  prices  was
lowered  through political  action.
VI.  Summary
The supply  management  approach  is  not designed to cope  with all
the  problems  of agriculture.  It cannot,  for example,  provide  good  in-
comes  to  farmers  on  small,  inadequate  units.  It cannot  stop  the  trend
to  larger and larger  farms.  It  cannot provide  managerial  ability  where
that  capacity  is  lacking.  But  it  can  do  one  thing,  providing  farmers
generally  are  willing  to  accept  controls:  It can stabilize the market.
It  can  take  the  feast  and  famine  characteristic  out of  agriculture  and
guarantee a good  and stable income  to the aggregate  of farm operators.
It  can  do  this  if  farmers  generally  value  good  and  stable  incomes
enough  to adopt the  discipline  of supply  management  that  is prerequi-
site to such incomes  in American agriculture  in the  1960's.
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